ACQUITTALS OR CONVICTIONS AS BARS TO
PROSECUTIONS FOR PERJURY
The procession of cases involving the entangled pleas of
former jeopardy and res judicata as applied to the criminal law suggests that courts have failed to grasp the distinction between the two pleas. The Supreme Court, however, will soon have the opportunity to lift the veil of confusion, since U. S. v. William,' now pending before that
Court, 2 confronts it with the necessity of exploring the
spheres in which former jeopardy and res judicata are
applicable.
In the Williams case, defendant Williams, having been
tried and convicted for violating the Civil Rights Act, was
indicted for perjury because of his allegedly false testimony
at the trial. Williams' co-defendants, charged with aiding
and abetting him in violating the Civil Rights Act, were
acquitted of that charge, but they too, were indicted for
perjury because of the testimony given by them at the trial.
The various defendants entered pleas of former jeopardy
and res judicata, upon which the District Court of Florida
dismissed all the indictments for perjury, and the Government appealed to the Supreme Court.
Undoubtedly the doctrines of res judicata and former
jeopardy arise from the same policy that a man should not
be twice subjected to jeopardy for the same cause, and that
litigation must come to an end."
Former jeopardy, which is expressly prohibited by the
constitutions of most of the states as well as that of the
United States, 4 comes into play when there is an effort to
1 93 F. Supp. 922 (1950).
2

19 L.W. 3204 (1951) (argued before Supreme Court).

" Miller, Criminal Law, § 186 (1934); Gehlbach, Res Judicata and

Conspiracy, 65 J. Grim. Law 58 (1948).
' A.LJ. Administration of the Criminal Law, §6, Comment A (1936).
All but five states-Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina and Vermont-have a constitutional provision against a second
trial for the same offense.

The Constitutions of thirtyfive states

and the United States provide that an Individual shall not be twice
subjected to "Jeopardy"; eight provide that after an acquittal a person
shall not be tried again for the same offense. Nothing is revealed In
any constitution as to what constitutes "Jeopardy" or what is the "same
offense".
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prosecute a defendant for an offense of which he has already
been acquitted or convicted. Thus, as applied to the criminal law, it is similar to the doctrines of merger and bar
which apply in civil actions to preclude a second suit on the
same cause of action.5
The doctrine of criminal res judicata-at least, as used
here--signifies that an issue once litigated in a criminal
proceeding can not be relitigated between the state and the
same defendant. It makes no difference that the offense
prosecuted in the second proceeding differs from that of the
former action, so long as the issue to be determined in the
second prosecution has been adjudicated in the first. Res
judicata is the analogue of what in civil actions is termed
collateral estoppel.6 However, unlike double jeopardy,
res judicata receives no explicit constitutional sanction unless, as seems rather doubtful, it may be deemed to have
been caught up in the ample folds of due process.
An illustration of the distinction between former jeopardy
and res judiata is afforded in the not infrequent situation,
especially in the Federal Courts, where a crime is charged,
and, either in another indictment or a second count of the
same indictment, the defendant is charged with having
conspired with others to commit the substantive offense. It
now seems well settled that acquittal of the conspiracy
charged would not constitute former jeopardy as to the
prosecution for the crime itself; and vice versa. The
offenses are neither the same in fact nor in law; either can
exist without the other. If, instead of an acquittal on one
charge there is a conviction on both, the absence of former
jeopardy permits consecutive sentences to be imposed.
The plea of.res judicata would be applicable however, if
the charges are separately tried, for in such an instance,
the first adjudication may be legally conclusive as to some
point involved in the second prosecution. In Sealfon v.
U. S.,7 A was acquitted of conspiring with B to commit a
Of. Restatement, Judgments if 47, 48 (1942).
* Of. Restatement, Judgments 13 68-72 (1942); Scott, (olateral
ZetoiPpe by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1942).
S822 U.S. 575 (1948).
'
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substantive offense, because the evidence failed to show an
agreement between the two persons. In a subsequent trial
of A for aiding and abetting B in committing the crime, the
Government was held by the Supreme Court to be precluded
by res judicata from reliance on the same evidence to show
a relationship between A and B.
Further examples of the operation of both former jeopardy and res judicata will be offered in analyzing each
doctrine and in determining whether either affects the situation involved in U. S. v. Wilams.
Former Jeopardy
Under former jeopardy "No person shall be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."" This raises the vexing problem: When are two
offenses "the same"?
Various tests have been laid down by the courts to answer
this question. An old English case undertook one of the
earliest efforts to answer this question in its test that:
"Unless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might
have been convicted upon proof of the facts contained in
the second indictment, an acquittal on the first indictment
can be no bar to the second." 9
Other courts restated this rule affirmatively to say that
if the evidence necessary to support the second indictment
U. B. Const. Amendment V.
Vandercomb's Case, 2 Leach C. C. 708, 720 (1796). The test was

however, not followed in two later cases. In Rex v. Sheen, 2 C & P 634
(1827), it was held that an acquittal of murder of a bastard child known
under one name is a bar to a.prosecution for murder of a bastard child
known under another name where the jury finds that only one child
was killed and it was known under both names. In Rex v. Clark, 1 B.
& B. 473 (1820), an acquittal of giving poison by forcing child to "swallow" poison was a bar to a prosecution for administering poison by

forcing the child to "take into the throat" the poison by which the child
died.
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would support a conviction under the first indictment, the
two offenses are the same. 10
Suppose that under a murder indictment the criminal
procedure of the applicable jurisdiction does not permit a
conviction of assault and battery. In such instances, under
the traditional rule that has been stated, an acquittal of
murder would not seem to constitute former jeopardy for
a second prosecution charging assault and battery. The
evidence that would sustain a conviction of assault and battery would not have sustained any conviction permissible
under the first indictment. Thus the defendant was never
before in jeopardy for the offense of assault and battery.
Such an analysis, however correct 'theoretically, would
probably be shrugged off by the court. The constant assertion of the commentators to the effect that acquittal or conviction of a greater offense bars a prosecution for any lesser
offense, 1 has not contained the limitation that under applicable procedural rules the.defendant could have been convicted of a lesser offense under the indictment for the
greater. Accordingly, in our hypothetical case of an acquittal for murder, few courts would permit a subsequent
indictment for assault and battery.
The commentators' statements may be correct in instances
of a conviction for a greater offense followed by a prosecution for a lesser, included offense; under the doctrine of
merger, the conviction of the greater would swallow up all
lesser crimes. 12 However, in cases of an acquittal of a
11People v. Defoor, 100 Cal. 150 (1893). The first information
charged assault with intent to murder, based upon the defendant hitting the victim with a bottle. This action resulted in a conviction of
assault. This was held to bar an action for mayhem, founded on the
fact that defendant bit the finger of the victim which later had to be
amputated, on the ground that it occurred during the same assault.
In State v. Price, 127 Iowa 301 (1905), the court in holding an acquittal
of statutory rape a bar to a subsequent prosecution for incest (though
another act of intercourse was alleged) the court said: "Itis conceded
that the same testimony would have supported either charge." See
also Moore v. State, 59 Miss. 25 (1881).
2 See, e.g., Mller, Criminal Law, 50 (1934).
1 Com. v. Roby,12 Pick. (Mass.) 496 (1832).
But, as the rule was
formerly stated, merger applied only to an offense of less degree. Thus
a felony would swallow up a misdemeanor but not another felony; nor
would a misdemeanor swallow up another misdemeanor.
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greater offense followed by prosecution for a lesser, merger
would not apply, and barring a second prosecution would
involve some disregard of the traditional "same evidence
rule" for applying former jeopardy.
Not only disregard but also occasional reformulation has
been the fate of the oft-stated "same evidence rule." One
court has suggested: "Another rule sometimes adopted is
that the conviction or acquittal on one indictment will be
a bar to another prosecution growing out of the same transaction." However, the Court retreated after this approach
to a doctrine that there should be only one offense punishable on the basis of a single transaction; it added that "this
also must be taken as a true rule in a general sense. A single
act or transaction may be an offense against two statutes or
against the law of two different jurisdictions, in which case
one prosecution will not bar the other."'1
The proliferation of statutory provisions creating new
criminal offenses, State and Federal, makes the latter remark especially significant. For instance, a bootlegger
prosecuted and convicted by State authorities is still subject
to prosecution in the Federal Courts for the same offense;
and if convicted he may be sentenced for a term to begin
after his State sentence expires. Or frequently, by what
amounts to a single act, the defendant may become subject
to prosecution for violation of several different statutory
provisions. 14 Unless one includes in its definitions all the
elements of the others, he may find himself serving consec15
utive sentences for the violations.
Another court, groping for a broader test of former jeopardy, has stated: "When the facts constitute but one offense,
though it may be susceptible of division into parts, as in
larceny for stealing several articles of property at the same
time, belonging to the same person, a prosecution to final
judgment for stealing a part of the articles will be a bar to
a subsequent prosecution for stealing any other part of the
articles, stolen by the same act."' 6
23State v. Stewart, 11 Ore. 238, 4 Pac. 128 (1883).
" See, e.g., Albrecht v. U. S., 273 U. S. 1 (1927).
Of., Ekberg v. U. S., 167 F. 2d 380 (1st Cir., 1948).
See State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282, 285 (1879).
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While some courts have strained to broaden the operation
of former jeopardy, others have narrowed it still further;
they have erected an exception that "when after the first
prosecution a new fact supervenes, for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense,
and together with the facts existing at the time constitute (s)a new and distinct crime, an acquittal or conviction
of the first offense is not a bar to an indictment for the other
distinct crime."1 7 Accordingly, if after a prosecution for
assault and battery with intent to commit murder, the
victim should die, a prosecution for murder is not subject
to the plea of former jeopardy.,,
Does not this exception dispose of the argument that
former jeopardy operates in the situation of the Williams
case? At the time of the indictment for violation of the
Civil Rights Act the alleged perjury had not occurred.
Indeed, it was the trial on that very indictment that gave
rise to the occasion for the acts of perjury. The falseswearing of the defendants was certainly as much of an
intervening event brought about by the defendant as the
death of the victim would be after prosecution for assault
and battery. Moreover, no one can suggest that the prosecutor, in contravention of the policy underlying the doctrine of former jeopardy, was seeking to vex the defendant
by "splitting a cause of action" and bringing in two indictments when he could have brought in only one.
Regardless of the "intervening fact" view, it is hard to
see how the perjury with which defendants are now charged could be the same offense as the crime for which they
were formerly tried. Perjury consists in wilfully giving
false testimony about a material matter before a competent tribunal. 19 The first prosecution, on the other hand,
was for acts of violence and under color of law whereby complaining witnesses had been deprived of the rights and
privileges secured by the laws of the United States.2 0 The
transactions were quite different in time and place; the
1 See State v. Littlefleld, 70 Me. 452, 456 (1880).
Com. v. Ramunno, 219 Pa. 204, 68 Atl. 184 (1907).
18 U.S.CA. §1621.
= 18 U.S.C.A. §242.
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criminal intent to be proved at the two trials was different;
and the physical acts constituting the second offense were
of a different category than those initially prosecuted. The
first prosecution was in no way designed to prosecute the
type of criminality constituting perjury.
Perhaps in some instances the evidence necessary to sustain an indictment for perjury would have sustained a
conviction for the substantive offense prosecuted at the
first trial. This might be true if the alleged perjury consisted merely of a general statement by defendant at his
first trial that he was not guilty of the offense charged. If,
however, his testimony related to only one of the several
issues in the case, and, a fotioii, if it related to a collateral
matter like the defendant's good character, proof of the
falsity of the defendant's statement would not necessarily
prove guilt of the offense first charged.2 1
The incredulity with which the courts have greeted the
assertion that former jeopardy is involved when a defendant
is prosecuted for perjury committed at his previous trial
for some other offense, has been expressed in several decisions. One court remarked: "By no stretch of the imagination can an assault with intent to murder committed on
June 13, 1912 be held to be the same offense, or anything
akin to it, as perjury committed on September 17, 1912,
even though the perjury is committed on the trial of the
assault to murder case." 22 Any opposite conclusion would
scarcely be in keeping with those decisions which have limited former jeopardy so as to permit more than one prosecution for a single transaction in which the defendant ran
afoul of several State and Federal statutory provisions.
1 Chitwood v. U.S., 178 Fed. 2d 442 (8th Cir. 1910). At page 443 the
Court said: "But if the particular testimony alleged to be false is as

general and broad as the charge of the crime-in other words, a denial
of guilt-a trial for perjury is virtually a second trial of the prior
case." Cf. Kuskulis v. U. S., 37 F. 2d 241. (10th Cir. 1929).
The accused was indicted for
2 Miles v. State, 165 S.W. 567 (1914).

assault with intent to murder, and on the trial of that offense wilfully
and falsely testified that he did not shoot or assault the victim; his
acquittal on the charge of the assault did not constitute a former

jeopardy so as to preclude his subsequent trial and conviction for
perjury committed in the assault case.
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The argument that to permit the plea of former jeopardy
would immunize a perjurer from punishment has influenced
the courts.
"It would make no difference whether convicted or acquitted, he (the defendant) would be immune
from perjury in either event."23
In the principal case the Court dismissed the indictment
of both Williams, who had originally been convicted, and
his co-defendants, who had been acquitted. The dismissal
was based on Ehrlich v. U. S.24 There the gravamen of the
charge was that the defendant had received excessive prices
for meat, though billed at the legal rate. The defendant
denied such receipt and was acquitted. He was later charged with perjury, his denial at the first trial being the basis
for the charge. The Court held that the acquittal barred
a subsequent prosecution for perjury with reference to
defendant's testimony about the act which constituted the
basis for the first prosecution. The jury's verdict was felt
necessarily to determine that issue of perjury. The court
said: ". . it appears to be well settled that where the fact
testified to and as to which the perjury is charged was the
act constituting the basis of the crime charged,--and this
fact was necessarily determinative of the issue,-an acquittal of the first offense bars a prosecution for perjury." 25
The Ehrlich opinion cited and seemed to follow U. S. v. Butler,26 where the court held that an acquittal for selling
liquor without payment of tax required by law was a conclusive adjudication in defendant's favor upon his subsequent trial for perjury, and that the government could not
show that the defendant, having sworn under oath that he
did not so sell, swore falsely.
However, a thorough analysis of the Ehrlich and Butler
cases reveals that these decisions seem to be explicable in
terms of res judicata rather than former jeopardy. 27 The
Butler case explicitly relates that there is no former jeop2 See Murf"v. State, 76 Tex. Cr. 5,12, 172 S. W. 238, 241 (1914).
145 F. 2d 693 (5th Cir. 1944).
35Id. at page 693.
38 Fed. 498 (E. D. Mich. 1889).
Incidentally, the annotators of 18 U.S.C.A. §1621 (1950), seem to
be guilty of confusion in classifying U. S. v. Ehrlich-and some other
cases--under former jeopardy rather than under res Judicata.
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ardy, but holds that the issue of the defendant's veracity
was (indirectly) passed upon at the first trial, and can not
be relitigated. This being so, the Ehrich case might be
authority for dismissing the indictment as to Williams'
co-defendants, who had initially been acquitted. But it
would not be applicable for dismissing the indictment as to
Williams, who, having been initially convicted, could scarcely claim any benefits from the doctrine of res judicata.
Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata signifies that:
"When the second suit is upon a different cause of
action, but between the' same parties, as the first, the
judgment in the former action operates as an estoppel
in the latter as to every point and question which was
actually litigated and determined in the first action,
but it is not conclusive as to other matters which
might
28
have been, but were not, litigated or decided."
In short, res judicata precludes relitigation of any issue
upon which a jury has once passed. 29 Consequently, to invoke res judicata requires that the court passing on the
plea must possess a knowledge of what was decided at the
original trial. For instance, suppose there were two elements, A and B, in the prosecution's case at the initial prosecution, and the defendant admitted neither. If there was
an acquittal, how could a subsequent court know-in the
absence of a special verdict-whether the acquittal had
resulted because the jury felt that the State had proved
A but failed to prove B, or proved B but failed to prove A,
or proved neither A nor B? Since the former verdict is
conclusive only as to facts directly and distinctly put in
issue, and the finding of which is necessary to uphold the
judgment, it can be argued that no res judicata resulted
from the acquittal. For instance, if the defendant should
claim that the acquittal was determinative of the nonexistence of A, the State can argue that finding the non8 See Stone, Res Judicata in Criminal Cases, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 231

(1948). The doctrine seems to have been first formulated in the famous
Duchess of Kingston case, 20 St. Tr. 355 (1779).
" People v. Rogers, 102 Misc. 437, 170 N. Y. Supp. 86 (1918).
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existence of A was not necessary to the prior judgment,
for the acquittal is perfectly consistent with the hypothesis,
A, but not B.30 Of course, this argument disregards the
irrebuttable, but irrelevant, proposition that "for all that
can ever be known, the jury's estimate of the facts" as to A
"caused it to find a verdict of not guilty."8' 1
Since the same reasoning can be advanced to dispute the
suggestion that the prior acquittal is conclusive of the nonexistence of B, the acquittal creates res judicata neither
as to A nor B. Of course, it would settle that both A and B
can not be true in a subsequent prosecution of the defendant, but if both A and B are involved in the subsequent
prosecution, the defendant would in most instances have
available the plea of former jeopardy.
Where, however, a defendant is able to show, by the same
record that his acquittal in the first prosecution rested upon
a defense which would determine the issues in the second
trial, the state would be estopped from litigating the issue.8 2
If, for example, the defendant were to invoke an affirmative defense, like alibi, or self-defense, and the record were
to show that the reason for his acqhittal was that the jury
believed his testimony, a subsequent prosecution involving
the same acts and defended by the same plea, would be
precluded on the ground that the defense had once been
placed in issue and was adjudicated.
If the defendant is claiming, as in the Williams case, that
his acquittal is res judiata in his favor when prosecuted
for perjury allegedly committed in the course of the first
litigation, he must show at least that the acquittal did
logically imply that the jury believed his testimony. Thus,
if the perjured testimony related to an issue that was material but not essential to the determination of the trial, defendant could scarcely claim res judicata. For instance, a
false oath as to character would be material, since "material" means "legally capable of being proved in the cause"
and refers to 'testimony that will legally evidence the propbid. Of. Kuakulls v. U. S., 37 F. 2d 241 (10th Mr. 1929).
See Kuskulls v. U. S., 37 F. 2d 241, 243 (10th Cir. 1929) (dissentIng opinion).
* Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S. E. 2d 573 (1941).
a
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osition to be proved. '3 3 However, it would not be on ar
ultimate issue in the case, so that acquittal would be perfectly consistent with the thesis that the jury believed
defendant to be lying about his character but thought that,
despite his bad character, he had not committeed the par34
ticular offense charged.
The cases conflict as to whether the defendant's acquittal
upon a criminal charge bars a subsequent prosecution for
perjury with reference to defendant's testimony about the
act constituting the basis for such a charge, as in the principal case. But both state and federal courts seem to agree
that one's acquittal upon a criminal prosecution is not a bar
to subsequent prosecution for perjury committed at the
former trial, where his testimony related merely to collateral matters and its falsity was not necessarily inconsistent with his innocence of the former crime.3 5
In our principal case, where the offense charged was a
violation of the Civil Rights Act, the indictment would require proof of two elements: that defendant had committed
the assault and battery and that he had done so under color
of office. If defendant's allegedly perjured testimony related to only one of these, for example the assault, would
not an acquittal be consistent with the proposition that the
jury thought he had lied about committing the assault but
felt that, though he had brutally assailed the victim, he had
not done so under color of office? Thus, no res judicata
would result. On the other hand, a conviction of defendant
would clearly mean that the jury, which decided every issue
against the defendant, determined that he had committed
the assault, and thus impliedly determined that he had lied
in saying he had not committed the assault.
The difficult case would be that in which the defendant
had testified as to every element of the crime and is being
indicted for his testimony after the acquittal, with each
statement being the basis for a separate count. The foregoing analysis indicates that to convict on one of these
counts would not be to relitigate issues determined by the
See U. S. v. Slutzsky, 79 F. 2d 504, 506 (3rd Cir. 1935).
Cf. Kuskulls v. U. S., 37 F. 2d 241 (10th Cir. 1929).
Ol
State v. Reynolds, 100 P. 2d 593 (1940).
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acquittal. But to convict on all, would be to undermine that
prior acquittal, since the jury necessarily concluded that at
least one element of the crime did not exist. Therefore, the
State cannot dispute that the defendant was telling the
truth in at least one of his statements denying the various
elements of the crime.
In this situation former jeopardy, embodying a policy
against splitting a cause of action, would presumably preclude consecutive sentences if defendant were convicted on
all the counts embodying his different statements made at
the first trial.3 6 Therefore the sentence imposed could not
rightfully exceed that which would be permissible on any
single count. But, since a conviction on one of the counts,
or, indeed, on all the counts except one, would be valid, it
would seem that the sentence should be referred to
those counts for perjury not barred by the defense of res
judicata. Thus, the conviction would stand.
So far the discussion has proceeded under the implied
premise that criminal res judicata is a doctrine universally
accepted. However, some courts seem to refuse it any
recognition. One court, where the defendant was acquitted
of the offense charged at a previous prosecution, in the subsequent trial for perjury asserted:
"In criminal prosecutions each fact relevant and
admissible in each separate prosecution may be proved
by testimony produced before the jury in that trial, and
it is immaterial what credence another jury in another
prosecution for a different and distinct crime may have
given the same or other testimony then produced in
respect to the same fact; because public policy demands
that when the state charges a citizen with the commission of a distinct crime, that charge shall be considered independently of any past transgressions. 3' 7
Whether the Federal courts would in any case accept the
doctrine of criminal res judicata was at one time somewhat
confused. Most of the confusion arose from a dictum of
Justice Holmes in Dunn v. U. S.,8 which involved the validity of inconsistent verdicts rendered on various similar
86

Of. Ekberg v. U. S., 167 F. 2d 380 (1st Cir., 1948).

3 See State v. Vandemark, 77 Conn. 201, 203, 58 At. 715, 716 (1904).
284 U. S. 390 (1932).

ACQUITTALS OR CoNVIcTIoNs AS BARS

counts. Justice Holmes, in sanctioning the inconsistency,
remarked: "This is no more than would have occurred if
two separate prosecutions had been involved for the determination of one charge would not constitute res judicata
as to the other."3 9 Why it would not constitute res judicata
was never too clear, unless it was assumed that res judicata
was not applicable in federal prosecutions.
Subsequently, in the Sealfo 4 ° case, the court gave at
least a partial welcome to the doctrine of res judicata, and
held that an acquittal precluded relitigation of an issue necessarily determined by the acquittal. This holding focuses
on protection of defendants against vexatious prosecutions.
In opposition, it can be argued that society's interest in
punishing criminals should-not be prejudiced in a later case
by the ineptitude with which a former prosecution was
handled. Also emphasis can be placed on the state's inability to appeal from errors of law committed at a trial, even
though those errors may have induced the jury's adverse
determination. Should the state be further penalized by
being bound by that determination when it brings a later
prosecution for an entirely different crime?
The argument that res judicata should not stem from
an acquittal gains added force when the second prosecution
is for perjury committed at the first trial; perhaps the acquittal was induced by that very perjury. If res judicata
is allowed to result from the former acquittal, may not the
perjurer be lifting himself by his own boot straps? Accordingly one Court suggested: "The efficient as well as the correct administration of justice demands that the defendant
in a prosecution for perjury should not be allowed to plea
in bar of the prosecution .the judgment of acquittal in the
case in which the alleged false testimony was given."' 4 1 Perhaps the special circumstances in this situation provide a
basis for avoiding an operation of the Sealfon rule. The
prosecution would probably be required, however, in the
29Id., at page 393. As to inconsistent verdicts, see Bickel, Jiuge and
Jury-Inconsistent Verdicts in the Federa7 Court, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 649
(1950).
10 Supra, note 7.
41 See Teague v. Comm., 172 Ky. 665, 670, 189 S. W. 908, 910 (1916).
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proper exercise of judicial discretion, to introduce some
evidence not presented at the former trial. 42
The contention has also been made that to allow a subsequent prosecution for perjury where the indictment for
perjury is based upon the testimony of the defendant at the
former trial in which he denied his guilt, and where the
verdict rendered was in favor of the defendant, would be
to permit prosecution to continue ad infinitum-and thus to
defeat the very purpose of the doctrines of res judicata and
former jeopardy.48
For the purpose of exploration let us suppose a hypothetical case. X, having been duly indicted, was tried and
acquitted of assault and battery. A subsequent prosecution
is instigated wherein X is charged with perjury, the basis
of which is his denial at the former trial of acts constituting
assault and battery. At this perjury trial, X offers pleas
of former jeopardy and res judicata, which are rejected by
the court. During this perjury trial X again takes the
stand, gives testimony substantially the same as before, and
is acquitted. X is again indicted for perjury, the basis of
this indictment being his denial of the assault and battery,
and the only new feature being that the perjury now indicted took place at the second rather than at the first trial.
The acquittal of the defendant in the first trial (for assault and battery) was held not to bar a subsequent trial
for perjury (trial number 2) although by implication it
attested the veracity of the defendant's testimony. How
then could the acquittal of perjury, despite its explicit finding as to the defendant's veracity be any more of a bar to
a later perjury trial than was the acquittal of assault?
Perhaps the distinction lies in the very fact that in one
instance the jury did make the explicit finding. As one
court suggested: "In the perjury trial, the question for the
-first time is squarely before the jury as to the truth of the
defendant's testimony. ' 4" Moreover, veracity is the ultimate issue in perjury.
0 Of., Allen v. U. S., 194 Fed. 664 (4th Cr. 1912).
0 See State v. Archuleta, 217 Pac. 619 (N. M. 191s).

" Id., at P. 622.
(1923).

Of., Com. v. Spivey, 243 Ky. 483, 48 S.W. 2d 1076
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It can also be suggested that irrespective of res judicata,
former jeopardy would apply to preclude the second perjury
prosecution. There is a recognizable difference betveen
assault and battery and perjury-between the offenses tried
at trials one and two. On the other hand,, trials .two and
three-both for perjury-involved offenses with substantially identical elements. Indeed, the only distinction would
be as to the time of the respective utterances;. and the statements correspond to such a dgree.that to prove the perjury
charged at trial three would necessarily be to prove the
perjury tried at trial two. Accordingly, even though the
giving of testimony at trial two constituted an "intervening
fact", it appears probable that courts would hold that under
the "same evidence", or any other, rule the second prosecution was barred by former jeopardy.
At all events, the effort to supply a reductio ad absurdum
encounters the practical obstacle that, regardless of..the
theory adopted, no court will allow a second trial for perjury
after a defendant has first been acquitted of a crime and
then acquitted of perjury allegedly committed at his trial
for the substantive offense. 45
Most of the preceding remarks consider whether an acquittal should create res judicata. But what about the significance of the conviction of the principal defendant, Williams, who is now being prosecuted for his alleged, and
rather fruitless, perjury at the first trial? Unlike the cases
of a prior acquittal, there is no doubt as to the issues on
which the jury based their decision. To convict, they were
obligated to decide every issue in favor of the prosecution.
If double jeopardy could be invoked, the prior conviction,
like a prior acquittal, would create immunity for the defendant. But under res judicata the conviction at the first
trial, instead of granting immunity, would tend to produce
an automatic conviction. Since the conviction signified that
the jury decided every issue against the defendant, it must
have concluded that he was lying about any issue in the
15See State v. Archuleta, 217 P. 619, 622 (N. M. 1937). "If the defendant is acquitted of perjury committed in the former trial for murder, wherein he had been likewise acquitted, the judgment of acquittal
would be a bar against any further prosecution for perjury."
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case as to which he testified. If criminal res judicata
operates against the defendant, his testimony at the first
trial cannot now be proved to be true. His statement, haying related to an issue at that trial, was clearly material.
The only thing left for the State to prove would be that the
testimony was made with knowledge of its falsity rather
than through an innocent mistake. Yet how difficult would
it be to convince a jury that a defendant who gave untrue testimony as a witness in his own behalf was doing so
intentionally?
If the State could thus avail itself of criminal res judicata, to convict of perjury a previously-convicted defendant
who had testified in his own behalf would be nothing more
than a formality. Indeed, it would be almost as automatic
as the conviction obtained in Commonwealh v. Evans. 48 In
that case the defendant had been convicted of assault and
battery. When subsequently his victim died, defendant was
indicted for murder. He sought to.introduce evidence sustaining a plea of self-defense, on which he had vainly
relied in the first case; but it was excluded on grounds of
res judicata. Consequently the State had only to prove that
the victim died of the wounds inflicted by the defendant in
order to sustain the indictment.
But will res judicata be applied against the defendant in
any criminal case? In support of its applicability it can
be argued in those jurisdictions permitting a defendant-to
claim res judicata that such a result is implicit in the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel-that "no person can claim
the benefit of a judgment as an estoppel unless he would
have been prejudiced by a contrary judgment or decision."' 7
The Supreme Court has spoken of res judicata as being "as
applicable to the decisions of criminal courts as to those of
civil jurisdiction,"'4 and has spoken with approval of Commonwealth v. Evans's utilization of the principle of "the
finality of a previous adjudication as to the matters determined by it," "the criminal and the civil law agreeing.""4
- 101 Mass. 25 (1869). See 27 Tex. L. Rev. 231, 239 (1948).
Quoted in U. S. v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
0 See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 334 (1912).
0 See U.S. v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916). Of. 27 Tex. L. Rev.
281 (1948).
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Under these statements of the Supreme Court there seems
no reason to believe that mutuality of estoppel, a normal
rule of res judicata, would not be applied and that a defendant could not be bound by a conviction for purposes of subsequent prosecution. However, a Circuit Court has confused
matters by stating: "Nor can there by any requirement of
mutuality with respect to a criminal judgment's conclusiveness." 50
Mutuality of estoppel would then, in general, support the
application of criminal res judicata. against the defendant.
If, however, in the situation presented by the principal case,
an exception is created to the normal rule that acquittal
produces res judicata in behalf of the defendant, mutuality
of estoppel would proclaim that conversely a conviction
should not benefit the prosecution in the trial for perjured
testimony at the earlier trial.
The same Circuit Court which stated there is no requirement of mutuality as to a criminal judgment's conclusiveness, asserted: "An accused is constitutionally entitled to
a trial de novo of the facts alleged and offered in support
of each offense charged against him, and to a jury's independent finding with respect thereto." 51 This "constitutional
right" seems to a great extent, to be founded upon sympathy for defendants and a feeling that in every trial a defendant should be entitled to full reliance on his presumption of innocence independent of the trammels of res
judicata.
Perhaps practical considerations enter into the reluctance
to apply res judicata against a defendant. If, instead of
two trials for two offenses, the charges had been combined
as counts of the same indictment, the jury in the exercise
of its mercy and discretion, might have acquitted on one
count and convicted on the other. Even if inconsistent, the
verdict on the two counts would stand. It could be argued,
that the defendant should be allowed as good an opportunity
as he might have received if the counts had been combined.
Since, however, the prosecution, in separating the two
charges into different indictments, has run the risk of res
11U.S. v. De Angelo, 138 F. 2d 466 (3rd Cir. 1943).
' Id. at p. 469.
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judicata from the first charge operating against the State,
why is it unjust to give the State the benefit of the conviction?
Another consideration as to the application of res judicata against the defendant is that to do so might induce
prosecutors to improve their won-loss averages by using a
prior conviction as a basis for a "push-over" second conviction. It has already been suggested that conviction of an
offense might lead to an almost automatic subsequent conviction of perjury by a defendant who had testified in his
own behalf. Might not a prosecutor be tempted by the easy
chance to better his percentage of convictions obtained?
One technical evidentiary consideration strongly suggests
that, independent of whether, in general, res judicata operates against a criminal defendant, it should not do so where
the second trial is for perjury. Perjury and treason are
still subject to the "two witness rule", which measures the
evidence by quantity as well as quality, and requires that
the perjury charge be corroborated by two witnesses. 2 If
a prior conviction binds the defendant under res judicata
as to the most significant issues under the indictment against
him, he is deprived of any opportunity to benefit from the
special requirements for a perjury conviction. Consequently, "the rule that the determination of an issue of fact in a
criminal case is conclusive in a subsequent criminal proceeding against the same defendant does not apply to a prosecu,tion for perjury * * * since in criminal prosecutions generally a conviction may be had upon the evidence of a single
witness, while a conviction of perjury cannot be had upon
the uncorroborated testimony of but one witness."5 3
Moreover, it probably should make no difference whether
or not the State presented two or more witnesses in support
of the charge at the trial where the defendant allegedly perjured himself. After all, presumably the case was submitted to the jury under normal "reasonable doubt" instructions, nothing being said about the number of witnesses.
The jury may have found only one witness credible, but
found that he was so credible as to prove the State's case
u Weller v. U.S., 323 U.S. 606 (1945).
5 State v. Sargood, 80 Vt. 415, 68 At. 49 (1907).
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beyond a reasonable doubt. In view of this possibility, the
State, it could be argued, should not be allowed to claim the
benefits of res judicata arising from the original conviction.
Even if the "two witness" rule is an anachronism, so long as
it remains law defendants should not be barred by res judicata from utilizing it in defending against the perjury
indictment.
One further possibility remains by which the prosecution
could claim assistance under the doctrine of res judicata.
The prosecutor, after the conviction of a defendant who had
testified in his own behalf, might move to have the defendant
cited for criminal contempt, the contempt being the alleged
perjury. Defendant's false swearing would seem to be punishable for contempt since its purpose was to obstruct the
administration of justice. 54 Presumably the contempt citation, like false swearing in Bankruptcy proceedings, 55 would
not be subject to perjury's technical requirement of corroboration by two witnesses. The falsity of the defendant's
testimony would have been conclusively adjudicated against
him by the jury verdict, so that no hearing would be required on that point. The intent to obstruct by falsehood
would be a compelled inference from the circumstances, once
the testimony's lack of truth was taken to be conclusively
established. Attempts to obtain such a contempt citation
would seem improbable, but heated litigation might generate
a desire in the prosecutor to "throw the book" at the defendant. Apparently the contempt citation would not, under
double jeopardy, bar a subsequent indictment for perjury.
If the contempt citation for perjury obstructing justice
followed an acquittal, its-validity would presumably hinge
on the same considerations of former jeopardy and res judicata that have already been set forth. Perhaps an effort to
use the sanctions of criminal contempt because of testimony
offered at a trial might in some instances be viewed by a
judge as an unwarranted effort of the prosecutor to deprive
a defendant of his right to a jury on a perjury charge.
I' Cf., U.S. v. Brown, 116 F. 2d 455 (7th Cir. 1940). But see In re
Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945).
0 Schonfeld v. U.S., 277 Fed. 934 (2nd Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 258
U.S. 623 (1922).
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Conclusion
Former jeopardy and res judicata both spring from the
principle that litigation must be terminable, and that one
should not be compelled tO prove the same thing an illimitable number-of times.
The principal case here fails to conform'to the standards
of the various tests applicable to determine the identity of
the offenses. As has been suggested, surely one would not
concede that perjury and a violation of the Civil Rights Act
by acts of violence were identical either in law or in fact;
accordingly a plea of former jeopardy should not be recognized in the Williams case as precluding the subsequent
action for perjury.
Further while public policy on the one hand demands the
termination of all litigation, and thus gives rise to the doctrine of res judicata, on the other hand there is no public
policy in favor of shielding perjury with artificial refinements and narrow technicalities."6 It would be an inexcusable monstrosity to allow one to offer perjured testimony
in the courts to insure an acquittal, and then to set up that
very acquittal as a' bar for the indictment of the acts of
perjury. This would be in effect permitting a 'principle
whose very creation was to effect justice to be used to defeat
that purpose. Public policy does not guarantee immunity
to criminals.
Whether a conviction should not only not be a defense 'to
the defendant, but should be available as a weapon against
him ,is debatable. To apply res judicata against the defendant may in some instances subject him to' drastic consequences derived from a case that he did not feel to be of
exceptional importance, and litigated with comparative
indifference. Moreover, even if criminal res judlcata
normally should operate against a defendant, it seems that
a conviction followed by a prosecution for defendant's
alleged perjury at the previous trial may present an exception to the general rule.
A defendant's plight is indeed unenviable. If he stays
off the stand, his silence may influence the jury against him;
Cf., Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App. 255, 73 So. 137 (1916).
O
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and in some jurisdictions it may even be commented on by
the prosecutor. 57 Yet if he goes on the stand, he can be
mercilessly grilled about his past indiscretions or misdeeds,
about any prison record, and in addition, he must consider
the possibility that his victory may be made hollow, or his
defeat even more calamitous, should the trial be followed
up by prosecution for perjury because of that to which he
testified. But though the defendant does find himself in
this precarious position, our courts should not sanction an
application of res judicata or former jeopardy that would
defeat administration of justice or preclude society from
bringing to bay one who through his perjured testimony
has endeavored to obstruct' justice.
JOHN
67 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).

A. DwYER.

